

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07  
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04  
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05  
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2286

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0406

FROM US MBFR REPRESENTATIVE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF JULY  
15, 1977

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JULY 15, 1977 INFORMAL SESSION OF  
THE VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THE  
CANADIAN REP, UK REP AND US REP, AND THE EAST BY SOVIET REPS  
TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, POLISH REP DABROWA AND CEZCHOSLOVAK  
REP MEISNER. MILITARY ADVISORS ALSO PARTICIPATED.

2. WESTERN REPS TABLED THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE  
ADDITIONAL DATA ON MILITARY MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES. THEY  
ALSO SUMMARIZED THE WESTERN POSITION REGARDING MANPOWER LIM-  
ITATIONS AND PHASE I COMMITMENTS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS  
OTHER THAN THE US.

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3. IN RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPS MADE  
A SHORT STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS: EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD  
STUDY THE PROPOSAL MADE IN THE PRESENT SESSION BY THE US REP  
WITH DUE ATTENTION. FIRST OF ALL EASTERN REPS WERE INTERESTED  
WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL, OR AT LEAST SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS, COULD  
BE USED FOR MOVING THE DATA DISCUSSION FORWARD AND IN PARTICU-

LAR FOR CLARIFYING THE REASONS FOR THE UNJUSTIFIABLY OVER-STATE WESTERN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME, EASTERN REPS WISHED CLEARLY TO STATE THAT THE PROPOSAL OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO EXCHANGE DATA FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE NATIONAL FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND TO DISCUSS THOSE DATA HAD NOT LOST THE TOPICAL NATURE AND REMAINED ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

3A. EASTERN REPS ASKED NO QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL EXCEPT ON TWO POINTS OF DETAIL BUT INDICATED THEY MIGHT HAVE SOME QUESTIONS FOR JULY 19 INFORMAL.

4. EASTERN REPS MADE STRONG ATTACK ON WESTERN POSITION CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TANK ARMY, CRITICIZING IN PARTICULAR WESTERN DEMANDS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL AND LIMITATION OF THE OTHER ARMAMENTS OF THE TANK ARMY IN ADDITION TO TANKS. THEY ATTEMPTED TO REFUTE WESTERN ACCUSATIONS OF INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN EARLIER EASTERN STATEMENTS AND PRESENT EASTERN DATA CLAIMS AND ATTACKED WESTERN POSITION ON THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHY ON OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY PARTICIPANTS, CLAIMING THAT GEOGRAPHY HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE OF BOTH SIDES AND THAT THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION METHOD THUS REPRESENTED AN EQUITABLE WAY OF TAKING IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHY INTO ACCOUNT. EAST ALSO ANSWERED WESTERN  
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QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA FROM JULY 5 SESSION AND STATED ITS VIEWS ON ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES.

5. TARASOV LED OFF WITH ATTACK ON WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TANK ARMY, IN PARTICULAR FOCUSING HIS CRITICISM ON THE ALLEGED INEQUITY OF REQUIRING THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ALL ARMAMENTS OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY IN ADDITION TO ITS TANKS. HE SAID THE WEST, WHILE REFUSING TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS, WANTED THE EAST TO WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY IN RETURN FOR 29,000 WESTERN SOLDIERS SELECTED AS INDIVIDUALS. IF THE WEST WANTED THE EAST TO REDUCE BY FORMATIONS, THE EAST WAS WILLING TO DO THIS, BUT IT MUST TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY AND THE WEST MUST MAKE SIMILAR REDUCTIONS OF EQUAL MILITARY VALUE. WHILE THE WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED THAT THE US WOULD LIMIT ONLY ITS WITHDRAWN ARMAMENTS, THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON PRACTICALLY ALL TYPES OF ITS ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS APPROACH WAS ALL THE MORE STRANGE SINCE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REFUSED TO REDUCE OR LIMIT ANY ARMAMENTS AT ALL. THE WEST'S SO-CALLED SELECTIVE PACKAGE APPROACH TO ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS WAS NOTHING BUT AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE ALL SOVIET ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA IN THE VISE OF LIMITATIONS WHILE RETAINING

ABSOLUTE FREEDOM FOR NATO TO INCREASE ITS ARMAMENTS. TARASOV SAID THAT IF THE EAST HAD AN INCORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WESTERN POSITION, WESTERN REP SHOULD SAY SO.

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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FROM US MBFR REPRESENTATIVE

6. US REP PRESENTED WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGE OF FURTHER DATA. HE SAID THAT, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTED THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND EXPEDITIOUS WAY OF CONTINUING THE DATA DISCUSSION. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF THE DATA DISCUSSION WAS TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER AND THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE IT WAS NECESSARY TO TABLE MORE DATA THAN THE OVERALL TOTALS NOW ON THE TABLE. THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED FOR THE MOST USEFUL FORM IN WHICH MORE DETAILED DATA COULD BE EXCHANGED. IT WOULD PROVIDE MORE DETAILED DATA BOTH ON THE STRENGTH OF THE MAJOR UNITS ON EACH SIDE AND ON THE REMAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA. IT WAS NECESSARY TO LOCATE THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY NOT ONLY AMONG THE FORCES OF THE VARIOUS DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BUT ALSO WITHIN EACH OF THESE FORCES. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT EXCHANGE OF  
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DATA IN THE FORM WEST WAS PROPOSING WOULD NOT AFFECT THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE. US REP SAID WESTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO ANSWER EASTERN QUESTIONS ON THIS PROPOSAL.

7. POLISH REP READING A PREPARED TEXT STATED THAT THE EAST WOULD STUDY THIS WESTERN PROPOSAL WITH DUE ATTENTION. IN ASSESSING THE PROPOSAL, THE EAST'S PRIMARY INTEREST WOULD BE WHETHER THE PROPOSAL OR AT LEAST SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS COULD BE USED TO MOVE THE DATA DISCUSSION FORWARD AND IN PARTICULAR TO CLARIFY THE REASONS FOR THE UNJUSTIFIABLY OVER-STATED WESTERN ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES. POLISH REP STATED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE NATIONAL DATA REMAINED ON THE TABLE. THE EASTERN REPS WERE CONVINCED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD ENABLE THE IDENTIFICATION IN A QUICK AND COMPLETE WAY OF THE ERRORS MADE BY THE WEST IN ITS DATA AND WOULD ALSO PERMIT THE CLARIFICATION OF SOME DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN OFFICIAL WESTERN FIGURES ON THE FORCES OF NATO PARTICIPANTS AND EASTERN ESTIMATES ON THE SAME FORCES.

8. POLISH REP WENT ON TO PRESENT REFUTATION OF WESTERN CHARGES IN JULY 5 SESSION OF INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN EARLIER EASTERN STATEMENTS AND PRESENT EASTERN DATA CLAIMS. HE SAID EASTERN REPS HAD NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF A DISPARITY EITHER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOR AT PRESENT. NOR HAD WESTERN REPS EVER IMPLIED THAT THE EAST AGREED WITH WESTERN ESTIMATES. BUT NOW, AT THE PRESENT STATE OF THE DISCUSSION, WESTERN REPS HAD SUDDENLY DISCOVERED AN ALLEGED EASTERN AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN CHARGES THAT THE EAST'S SUDDEN CHANGE OF POSITION WITH REGARD TO EXCLUSION OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS IN THE WEST INDICATED THAT EASTERN FIGURES WERE NOT COMPLETE, POLISH REP SAID THAT THE WEST HAD 200,000 MEN IN MILITARY POSITIONS WHICH DIRECTLY ASSURED THE COMBAT READINESS OF NATO FORCES. IF THESE PERSONNEL WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, THERE WOULD BE A  
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REAL, NOT AN INVENTED, DISPARITY IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN FAVOR OF THE WEST. THE EAST HAD DECIDED NOT TO PRESS DEMANDS OF THIS KIND IN THE INTERESTS OF AGREEMENT. BUT IF THE WEST CONTINUED TO MISUSE THIS EASTERN MOVE AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE EAST, THE EAST MIGHT HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION.

9. THE US REP AGAIN INVITED EASTERN REPS TO RAISE POSSIBLE QUESTIONS ON THE WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL. TARASOV REPLIED THAT EAST WOULD STUDY THE PROPOSAL CAREFULLY AND WOULD ASK ITS QUESTIONS, IF THEY HAD ANY, AT THE JULY 19 INFORMATION SESSION.

10. UK REP PRESENTED WESTERN VIEWS WHY THE ONLY REALISTIC AND EQUITABLE APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS IN THE VIENNA TALKS WAS THROUGH COMBINING A COLLECTIVE LIMITATION ON THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE IN THE AREA WITH A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON THAT PORTION OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE US AND USSR WHICH REMAINED DEPLOYED IN THE REDUCTION AREA. UK REP GAVE WESTERN ARGUMENTS FOR COLLECTIVITY AND SAID SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA WERE ALSO AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THESE WERE JUSTIFIED BY THE SUPER POWER STATUS OF THESE TWO PARTICIPANTS. IT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT WESTERN SECURITY IF FOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD RETAIN THE CAPACITY TO INCREASE ITS FORCES NOT ONLY IN THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION BUT IN THE REDUCTION AREA AS WELL. IT WAS CLEAR THAT IF THE FORWARD CONTINGENT IN THE REDUCTION AREA OF THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE TO INCREASE IN SIZE AFTER WESTERN FORCES HAD BEEN REDUCED AND LIMITED AS TO THEIR TOTAL SIZE, WESTERN SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED. AT THE SAME TIME, A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON THAT PORTION OF SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER DEPLOYED IN THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD NOT BE AN IMPORTANT MILITARY BURDEN TO THE USSR IN VIEW OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY.

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FROM US MBFR REPRESENTATIVE

11. CZECHOSLOVAK REP ATTACKED THE WESTERN POSITION THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE THE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT ON REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OBLIGATIONS. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CLAIMED THAT BOTH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT HAD ALREADY TAKEN ACCOUNT OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAD ORGANIZED THE STRUCTURE OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA OVER THE YEARS. HE SAID THAT, JUST AS GEOGRAPHY GAVE THE WEST CERTAIN CONCERNS, A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN THE RESULTING WESTERN POSITION GAVE THE EAST CONCERN, INCLUDING WESTERN EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND AIR FORCES; US RAPID REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY; FRG MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY; THE LOCATION OF THE WEST'S LARGEST COMPONENT, THE FRG MILITARY FORCES, IN A FORWARD POSITION VIS A VIS THE EAST; AND US FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT GEOGRAPHY HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE EXISTING FORCES OF BOTH SIDES, THE EAST'S  
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EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION APPROACH WAS THE ONLY FORM OF REDUCTION WHICH WOULD AVOID INEQUITY FROM GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS.

12. CANADIAN REP SUMMARIZED THE WESTERN POSITION ON PHASE I COMMITMENTS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US. HE SAID THAT, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, ALL SPECIFIC MATTERS RELATING TO REDUCTIONS OF NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING THE TIMING OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS WERE ISSUES RELATING TO A PHASE II AGREEMENT AND PROPERLY A SUBJECT FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE EAST'S APPROACH TO PHASE I COMMITMENTS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US WOULD ENTAIL ACCEPTANCE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, INCLUDING COMMITMENTS BY ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF MILITARY MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS, AND REDUCTION BY UNITS, ALL TO BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN A FIXED TIME TABLE OF IMPLEMENTATION. THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL WAS THEREFORE NOT REALLY A PROPOSAL ON PHASING. IT WAS A PROPOSAL TO AGREE ON THE TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUSLY AGREED REDUCTION OR AT BEST AN INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF PHASING. THE EAST SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO DROP ITS REQUIREMENT THAT ALL THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS IN THE FIRST AGREEMENT WHICH AMOUNTED TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE ENTIRE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH.

13. TARASOV RESPONDED TO WESTERN QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE JULY 5 SESSION. HE ALSO DESCRIBED EASTERN APPROACH TO THE ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES. HE SAID THE EAST HAD USED THE SAME PRINCIPLE OF ALLOCATION BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES BOTH IN THE FIGURES WHICH IT HAD TABLED ON EASTERN FORCES AND IN ITS ESTIMATES OF WESTERN FORCES. THE BASIC IDEA WAS

TO ALLOCATE SIMILAR FORCES TO ONE AND THE SAME SERVICE. THUS,  
THE EAST HAD ALLOCATED THE AIR DEFENSE UNITS OF SOVIET AND  
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US FORCES TO GROUND FORCES. IT HAD INCLUDED IN GROUND  
FORCES MANPOWER THOSE AIR DEFENSE UNITS OF THE FRG, UK BELGIAN,  
NETHERLANDS, GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH ORGANIZA-  
TIONALLY WERE WITHIN BRIGADES, DIVISIONS, ARMY CORPS AND ARMIES  
AND WERE DESIGNATED FOR THE DIRECT PROTECTION OF THOSE FORCES.  
THE EAST HAD ALLOCATED THE NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE OF POLAND AND  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE UNITS OF THE  
NATO COUNTRIES, TOGETHER WITH THEIR SUPPORT UNITS TO THE AIR  
FORCES. THE EAST HAD ALLOCATED PERSONNEL OF THE FRG  
PERSHING MISSILE FORCES TO NATO GROUND FORCES. AS THE EAST  
UNDERSTOOD THE WEST'S POSITION, THE WEST HAD SOME TIME AGO  
INDICATED IT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THIS ALLOCATION. HOWEVER,  
THE WEST HAD TAKEN NO ACTION TOWARDS CORRECTING ITS ESTIMATES  
BASED ON FAULTY ALLOCATION AND THE WEST WAS STILL CONTENDING  
THAT WESTERN ESTIMATES BOTH OF THE OVERALL STRENGTH AND OF THE  
STRENGTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF  
WARSAW TREATY STATES WERE ACCURATE. IN RESPONSE TO A POINT  
MADE BY WESTERN REPS IN JULY 5 SESSION, TARASOV DENIED THAT  
THE EAST HAD EXCLUDED FROM ITS DATA NY ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL IN  
THE AREA ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE ASSIGNED TO THE FORMATIONS  
OF OTHER MINITRIES AND DEPARTMENTS. END SUMMARY.RESOR

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